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‘By the mere fact that he forms part of an organised crowd’, argued Gustave Le Bon 
(1896/1946, 32), the pioneer of crowd psychology, ‘a man descends several rungs in the 
ladder of civilization. Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a 
barbarian…a creature acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the violence, the 
ferocity…to be induced to commit acts contrary to his most obvious interests and his best-
known habits.’  
In his struggle to secure an honourable exit from power in the course of the Egyptian 
revolution in 2011, the deposed president, Housni Mubarak, would have wished Le Bon to be 
right. He may have hoped that the demonstrators of Midan al-Tahrir (Liberation Square; 
henceforth Midan) in central Cairo to be ferocious and instinctive in expressing their political, 
sectarian, and social beliefs. He may have wished to see Islamist banners, the Christian Copts 
being attacked, the army violently confronted, or the flags of Iran or the US waved. But the 
demonstrators hand in mind a different performance for the floundering president and the 
public. They exercised what I call in this study a politically conscious, yet temporary, 
collective restraint action. Beyond the violent clashes in the first four days of the revolution 
(25-28 January), in the Midan demonstration (29 January-11 February) the revolutionaries 
aimed to deflate the regime’s strategy and narrative—political tricks of survival which 
Mubarak nurtured in his 30-year rule, which many Egyptians have learned to decipher—by 
accentuating and overtly dramatizing the ‘peaceful’, ‘civil’, ‘nationalist’ and ‘domestic’ 
nature of the revolt. The politically heterogeneous crowd managed to inhibit many of its 
divisions and to act collectively, promising the public of an alternative society. A society, as 
the demonstrators envisioned, where political and religious tolerance will be high, where 
security will be maintained, where sexual harassment will be diminished, and where the 
streets will be clean. The performance succeeded, managing to persuade the Egyptian and 
international publics to back its desire for Mubarak to step down
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 Why did the demonstrators repress their political and religious beliefs? Why did they 
refrain from using violence? Why did they feel obliged to persuade the public of their acts? 
Why did they accentuate certain slogans and inhibit others? Studies on various forms of 
socio-political protest have examined the origins, behaviour, rationality, and variations of 
social movements, revolutions, demonstrations, street marches, and riots
2
, but in this literature 
the element of collective restraint has not been given sufficient attention.
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 Other studies show 
how leaders like Egypt’s Nasser (Khashan, 1995), Congo’s Lumumba (Klein and Licata, 
2003), and Ukraine’s Yuschenko (Beissinger, 2011), or organisations like Hizbullah (Saouli, 
2011) are conscious of the socio-political structures they operate in and instrumentally adopt 
or desist from using certain discourses and actions, yet these studies have not theorised 
unorganised collective restraint action or examined it empirically. 
In this paper I aim to fill this gap by examining the socio-political origins of collective 
restraint action in the Midan. I ask how and under what conditions do politically 
heterogeneous groups exercise collective restraint? I build on different approaches in 
sociology, particularly the social movements literature and social psychology. This, however, 
is a work of political science; I treat the Midan demonstration as a critical event in regime-
society relations, and a continuation and development of existing ‘repertoires of contention’ 
(Tilly, 2006, p. 35). Building on the work of Norbert Elias (1939/1990), I argue that 
Mubarak’s regime, which garnered a monopoly over coercive power and the national 
narrative—representing itself as the guardian of unity, stability, and sovereignty—formed an 
external constraint for political change in Egypt. This external constraint generated into 
internal collective restraint in the Midan. The collective restraint, I show, was motivated by 
an attempt to discredit Mubarak’s strategy and rhetoric. Whilst this collective behaviour 
appeared as ‘spontaneous’, I argue that this spontaneity originates from a collective 
consciousness of: (a) regime strategy and narrative; (b) dominant socio-political values; and 
(c) existing repertoires of contention. This form of collective restraint action, I find, was 
temporary. When Mubarak stepped down, the compulsion for collective restraint subsided.   
I present this argument in three sections. Firstly, I conceptualise the Midan 
demonstration as a ‘contentious performance’ (Tilly, 2008), and then define collective 
restraint action as one variant of contentious performances. Secondly, I demarcate the main 
factors that shape and contribute to collective restraint action in regime-society struggles. 
Thirdly, I present an empirical analysis of the Midan demonstration, examining how and why 
the demonstrators exercised collective restraint. The empirical section is based on first-hand 
accounts and semi-structured interviews I carried out in Cairo in 2012.
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Contentious performances and collective restraint  
The Midan demonstration, which lasted for 14 days (28 January to 11 February 2011), can be 
conceptualised as a ‘contentious performance’: ‘occasions on which people break with daily 
routines to concert their energies in publicly visible demands, complaints, attacks, or 
expressions of support before returning to their private lives’ (Tilly, 2006, p. 49). Collective 
claim-making demarcates an actor with an identity (say a political oppositional group), who 
carries specific claims against another (such as a government), and who demands recognition 
as a legitimate social actor (Tilly, 2008, p. 89). The Midan demonstration collectively 
identified itself as a revolutionary movement, representing a broad base of Egyptian social 
segments (workers, writers, students, religious men, soldiers etc.) that was united under a 
clear, but politically disruptive, program: Al-shaab urid iskat al nizam! (the people want the 
fall of the regime!).  
In making collective claims, however, peaceful activists, revolutionaries or armed 
insurgencies have in mind a third party: a public. The presence of a public—as a latent 
political force—forms a structural constraint that shapes actors’ discourse and action in 
contentious politics. Since the public can be mobilised in support or in defiance of a claim, 
and since this can be decisive for political battles, contentious politics is also about 
performance. A performance ‘involves representation in a dramatic form, as movements 
engage emotions inside and outside their bounds attempting to communicate their message. 
Such performance is always public, as it requires an audience which is addressed and must be 
moved’ (Eyerman, 2006, p.193). To mobilise the public, a claim-maker will invest in 
speeches and symbols aiming to ‘frame’ an event in ways that resonate with its own political 
objectives and public values. Framing ‘provides the sorts of shared meanings necessary to 
facilitate social mobilization’ (Schewdler, 2006, p. 162). These frames must culturally 
resonate with a society’s social expectations and values (Williams, 2004, 105). During the 
Egyptian revolution, the regime, in a typical tactic to de-legitimise the opposition, framed the 
demonstration as ‘foreign funded and orchestrated’, which will bring ‘chaos’ to Egypt. On the 
other hand, the demonstrators had to convince the public that their movement was ‘peaceful’ 
and ‘nationalistic’. As Alexander (2011, x) observes, the Egyptian revolution relied on its 
‘cultural power’: ‘its ability to project powerful symbols and real-time performance, plot-
compelling protagonists and despicable antagonists; to stimulate and circulate powerful 
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emotions; to organize exemplary solidarity; to create suspense; and finally to minister 
ignominious defeat to dark and polluted adversaries…’  
I intentionally define the Midan crowd here as a performance to distinguish it from a 
protest. As I will illustrate below, the first four days (25-28 January 2011) of the revolution 
consisted of a protest: a popular reaction expressing frustration at the Mubarak regime. The 
remaining fourteen days, however, revealed the emergence of a political actor represented in 
the Midan that is responsive to regime behaviour and to public apprehensions. This response 
involved collective restraint: a contentious performance in where a crowd controls and 
regulates its behaviour by suppressing certain political emotions, slogans and actions. This 
may include inhibiting in-group divisions and representing a united front, curbing the use of 
violence, and ostensibly conforming to social values and expectations. A collective restraint 
action is always embedded in, and is conscious of, a socio-political context. It is motivated by 
specific political aims, and is in pursuit of wider social acceptance and legitimacy.  
 Collective restraint is essentially about social representation. Although the Midan 
demonstrators had a common Egyptian identity, they were politically and religiously 
heterogeneous. What emerged in the Midan is a representational sense of shared identity: this 
‘identity is shared in the sense that a set of people define themselves in terms of the same 
category membership. This engenders a cognitive shift whereby crowd members adopt a 
common perspective on which to base thought and judgment’ (Reicher, 2011, p. 438, italics 
original), and we should add: action. This representational identity relates to—and is shaped 
by—the social context and not the actual identity of a crowd. As Alexander observes, the 
meaning contending actors seek to demonstrate for others ‘may or may not be one to which 
they themselves subjectively adhere; it the meaning that they, as social actors, consciously or 
unconsciously, wish to have others believe’(2006, p. 32).  
However, why do individuals and crowds choose to represent themselves? How do 
they become conscious of what to restrain or expose? The collective restraint action in the 
Midan was, largely, unorganised, but what are the origins of this ostensibly ‘spontaneous’ 
collective action?   
 
Theorising collective restraint action in regime-society struggles  
For Norbert Elias, socio-political interdependencies constrain social action, obliging 
individuals and groups to exercise self-restraint as they seek to achieve their goals.  In his 
monumental study on The Civilizing Process (first published in German in 1939 and later 
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translated into English in 1978), Elias explored the social conditions that generate restraint. 
He examined the changing culture relating to manners in European history (and the booklets 
that educated readers of when, where, and how to burp, spit, or blow one’s nose in the 
presence of others) attributing this to macro civilising processes. For Elias the knot that ties 
these processes is state formation: namely the monopolisation of the use of violence, which 
pacified large territories, facilitating trade, the growth of cities, the division of labour, 
monetisation, and, crucially for war-making, the monopolisation of taxation, which in turn 
reinforced the monopolisation of coercion (Ibid., pp.185-344).  
This social integration tied more individuals and groups in a social web, making them 
interdependent (Ibid., p. 367). The actions and attitudes of an individual, his or her 
opportunities for success or failure, began to be shaped and determined by knowledge of, and 
conformity with, the social standards imposed by that interdependence. For Elias, and this is 
central to the study of collective restraint, what happens in the civilising processes is that the 
external social constraints that individuals confront as a result of their interdependence begin 
to shift and transform into internal self-restraints (Ibid., p. 109):  
The social standard to which the individual was first made to conform from outside by external restraint 
is finally reproduced more or less smoothly within him or her, through self-restraint which operates to a 
certain degree even against his or her conscious wishes.     
Social interdependence cultivates the self-restraint skills of foresight and 
rationalisation. With foresight and rationalisation social actors repress their immediate short-
term social needs in anticipation of long-term success, as Elias observes: ‘Each man, as it 
were, confronts himself. He “conceals his passions”, “disavows his heart”, “acts against his 
feelings”. The pleasure or inclination of the moment is restrained in anticipation of the 
disagreeable consequences of its indulgence’ (Ibid., pp. 398-9). Becoming conscious of the 
consequences of one’s acts on his or her social success and survival rationalises human 
conduct. Thus, for Elias: 
Continuous reflection, foresight, and calculation, self-control, precise and articulate regulation of one’s 
own affects, knowledge of the whole terrain, human and non-human, in which one acts, become more 
and more indispensible preconditions of social success. (Ibid., 398)   
The centralisation of the use of violence in a delimited territory, for example, acts as an 
external social constraint, making ‘the use of violence more or less calculable, and forces 
unarmed people in the pacified social spaces to restrain their own violence through foresight 
and reflection’ (Ibid., 373).  
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Elias, to be sure, examined long processes of European social development, but his 
central thesis on how human interdependence establishes compulsive and impersonal external 
constraints, which remould social behaviour into self-restraints, and his notion of the 
‘knowledge of the whole terrain’ are very useful in examining collective restraint in regime-
society relations. To account for collective restraint action in regime-society relations, 
however, I suggest three interrelated factors: (1) regime strategy and narrative; (2) socio-
political values; and (3) repertoires of contention (Tilly 2007). These factors, which vary 
across cases, form external social constraints, which set the parameters for collective political 
action by rival groups.  
Regime strategy and narrative: Unlike most European states, which took centuries 
to crystallise, late state-builders of the 20
th
 century, including the Middle East, installed 
political regimes that were vulnerable to reconstruction.
5
  Many authoritarian regimes sprang 
up as a reaction to colonialism in different parts of the developing world in the 1950s and 
1960s aiming to achieve national independence and socio-economic reforms. When these 
regimes captured state institutions (such as the police, security, army, government), they 
attempted to centralise and consolidate their power through the monopolisation of the means 
of violence, ideology, and, to varying degrees, economic resources (Saouli, 2012, pp. 8-27, 
49-61).  
In their survival strategies, regimes centralise the tools and use of violence; they 
repress, or when possible incorporate, their rivals who attempt to threaten their power; they 
economically reward or punish friends or rivals, respectively; they divide the opposition; they 
establish bogus political opposition parties and hold fraudulent elections (Chehabi and Linz, 
1998). Crucially, regimes also produce a political narrative that is drawn from existing socio-
political values (see figure below). This is not an objective history of a country; rather, as 
Walton argues, narratives are constructed ‘for the aims of present action’…Narratives make 
claims for the virtues of their individual and institutional authors, often as a counterpoint to 
rival claimants’ (quoted in Tilly, 2005, 211). In monopolising the national narrative, in 
representing themselves as the sole guardians of national sovereignty and unity—defining 
who is the ‘loyal’ citizen or the ‘traitor’—regimes establish frameworks of public discourse, 
ingraining what Wedeen calls ‘the rhetorical context’ (1998, 507).  
Regimes, thus, become the locus of a social web that ties people together; they form 
an external constraint that delimits political action. The quest for socio-political success and 
survival invites individual and collective restraint. In Syria, for example, the Baathist regime 
had ‘disciplinary effects’ on many Syrians who, whilst not necessarily believing in Hafez 
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Assad’s cult, had to ‘act as if they do’ (Wedeen, 1998, 505, italics original). As one Syrian 
observed, ‘People don’t post the signs because they love him, but because the system is self-
enforcing and people are accustomed to it. People have internalized the control’ (quoted in 
Wedeen, 1998, pp. 506-7, 512; emphasis added). In representing itself as the beacon of Arab 
nationalism and resistance to Israel and as a guardian of unified Syria, the regime ‘inhibited 
collective action and opposition’ (Ismail, 2011, pp.541, 540).  
Two points are in order. First, regime strength varies across cases. The higher the 
regime dominance over different social spheres, the more collective restraint rival groups will 
exercise, and vice-versa. Second, when socialising into authoritarian regimes, individuals and 
groups become conscious of regime strategy and narrative. This consciousness is crucial for 
collective restraint when opportunities for mobilisation against a regime arise.  
 Socio-political values: a second factor that shapes collective restraint action is the 
dominant values a society holds, or what Williams calls a ‘cultural environment’: ‘the socially 
and culturally available array of symbols and meaning from which movements can 
draw’(2004, 96, emphasis original). These originate from a country’s cultural and religious 
make-up, and are shaped by its political development (Saouli, 2012, 15-28). In contentious 
performances, actors must appear to conform to and represent these standards. The cultural 
environment, accordingly, shapes how actors frame situation. Of these standards is the 
“national interest” or “national unity”, which political actors must appear to promote. In 
divided societies such as Lebanon, Syria, or Ukraine, ‘national consensus’, dictated by the 
need to incorporate all communal groups in government, is a norm to be respected. In post-
colonial states, the norm of ‘national independence’ is a sacred value that leaders have to 
represent. 
But these norms and values become ‘open for rival interpretations and potential 
transcendence in meaning’ (Williams, 2004, 104). When an opposition rebels against a 
regime, it is partly challenging the regime’s monopoly over the representation of certain 
socio-political values. For example, in 1997 Jordanian activists protested against an Israeli 
trade fair held in Amman. In an attempt to ‘deflate government’s ability to react with 
repression’ and to prevent the regime from instrumentalising  identity divides, the 
demonstrators performed a pro-nationalist identity, which ‘imagined a common Jordanian 
identity, one that crosses religious, ethnic, class, and regional divides’ (Schwedler, 2005, p. 
170-2). Similarly, in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, Yushchenko was conscious to frame the 
campaign ‘in civic rather than ethnic nationalism’ to unite the heterogeneous crowd 
(Beissinger, 2011, p. 35). As such, some movements ‘choose—and some are forced—to use 
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cultural expressions that originate with their rivals in order to achieve a place in public life’ 
(Williams, 2004, 103).  In the initial months of the Syrian uprising (March-October 2011), 
demonstrators represented themselves as the ‘Syrian people’, chanting ‘“Not Sunni and not 
Alawi, we want freedom”’ (Ismail, 2011, p. 543). Such a performance aimed to neutralise 
regime claims on the “dangers of sectarianism” and to break its monopoly over the 
representation of national values; it also appealed to the reluctant segments of the Syrian 
public—especially its minority groups who feared that they could be targeted should Asad’s 
predominantly Alawite regime collapse.     
 Repertoires of contention form the third factor that compels collective restraint. As 
Tilly explains, the ‘theatrical metaphor calls attention to the clustered, learned, yet 
improvisational character of people’s interaction as they make and receive each other’s 
claims’ (2006, p. 35). Repertoires draw attention to both actors’ knowledge of previous 
struggles (say with an authoritarian regime) and their ability to improve on existing tools of 
political protest; they inform movements of which strategies—violent or peaceful—and 
frames to restrain or pursue. For example, the socialisation of Islamic movements such as 
Hizbullah, the Muslim Brothers, or Turkey’s AKP, in secular or multi-sectarian regimes,  
have restrained their political strategies and discourse making them more conducive to socio-
political expectations and constraints (Saouli, 2011; Naguib, 2009; Mecham, 2004).   
 The organisers of the Midan demonstration, as I will elaborate, were informed by 
previous struggles with the Mubarak regime, insisting for example that the demonstration 
should be peaceful. But the unexpected influx of huge numbers of people required an 
improvisation of existing repertoires to cope with the challenges and opportunities of the 
moment: this is where organisation meets spontaneity.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
  
Socio-poli cal	
Values	
Repertoires	of	
Conten on	
Collec ve	
Restraint	
Ac on	
Regime	Strategy	
and	Narra ve	
 
 
Figure 1. Socio-political origins of Collective Restraint Action (CRA) in the Midan 
 Regime strategy and narrative as a determining factor of CRA  
 
Socio-political values and repertoires of contention as contributing factors of CRA 
 
Building on this framework, I will first provide a background to the Midan 
demonstration and then will examine how and why the Midan demonstrators exercised 
collective restraint. I argue that knowledge of regime strategy and narratives, of Egyptian 
socio-political values, and experience from previous struggles with the regime, have all 
motivated the exercise of temporary collective restraint, which was necessary to win over the 
Egyptian public and to defeat Mubarak’s narrative. As Figure 1 illustrates, the Mubarak 
regime formed the external constraint that determined the collective restraint behaviour of the 
Midan demonstrators; political values and repertoires of contention, on the other hand, acted 
as contributing factors to this collective action.   
 
From Protest to Performance: The road to Midan 
The protest that erupted on 25 January 2011 was a continuation of contentious regime-society 
struggles, which started in 2000. In his first decade as president (1981-90), Mubarak 
consolidated his power by repressing a militant Islamic movement, a police mutiny, and by 
limiting the opportunities for the rise of any challengers (especially from the army) to his 
power. Through his regime’s control over the public media, security agencies, and the 
parliament, Mubarak managed to maintain a stable rule through out the 1990s. The first signs 
of political dissent appeared in the early 2000s and were subsumed under protests in support 
of the Palestinian Intifada in 2000 and in opposition to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
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Gradually various political factions (Nasserites, Islamists, Socialists) began to express 
opposition to Mubarak’s rule. In 2004, before a scheduled referendum to mark his fifth six-
year term, political and civil society groups, such as the prominent Kefaya! (Enough!) 
Movement, held public protests and called for democratic reforms, including a rejection of 
another term for Mubarak or succession to his son, Gamal (Clarke, 2011). In 2006 industrial 
workers in the private and public sectors held around 222 forms of protests (El-Mahdi, 2009, 
p. 100). On April 6, 2008 textile workers in the industrial cities of Mahalla and Kafr al-Dawar 
in the Nile Delta mobilised for a strike in their workplace. In solidarity, several associational 
groups and Facebook activists called for a national strike, demanding a minimum wage and 
an end to corruption and police brutality. The security forces repressed the protests, but the 
event gave birth to the April 6 Youth Movement, which would be a main mobiliser for 
January 2011 protests (Carr, 2012; El-Ghosaby 2012).   
By Jaunuary 2011, however, four events heightened national frustration with the 
regime. First, the Israel war on Gaza of 2008/9 revealed the regime’s incapacity to shape 
events in their neighbouring strip (many Egyptians believed the war decision was made in 
Cairo). Second, the rigging of the 2010 legislative elections, giving 97 percent of the vote to 
the NDP, showed the regime’s intention to repress the opposition and to facilitate Gamal’s 
succession. Third, in June 2010 security officers brutally beat to death a bloger, Khaled Said, 
in Alexandria. The incident exposed police brutality, reminding the public of the daily 
humiliation the force inflicted on many Egyptians. In response, activists established a 
Facebook page entitled ‘We are all Khaled Said’, which became a mobilising tool against the 
regime (Maghdi, 2011, pp. 39-42). Finally, the attack on the Al-Qiddisin Church in 
Alexandria on 1 January 2011, which led to the death of 21 people, revealed the security’s 
incapacity to protect Egyptian Copts; many suspected that the regime had ‘orchestrated’ the 
attack to deepen sectarian fissures and to deflect attention from the Tunisian revolution (al-
Mahmadi, 2012, p. 8). In December 2010, the ‘We are all Khaled Said’ Facebook page 
mobilised for a day of protest, intended on the National Police Day, 25 January 2011, calling 
for an end to police brutality and the resignation of the interior minister (Magdi 2011, pp. 50-
51).   The fall of Tunisia’s Bin Ali on January 14, which generated a ‘melange of joy, shock 
and hope’ in Egypt (Al-Sheikh, 2011, p. 24), however,  led several political youth groups to 
meet and organise for what now came to be called a ‘Day of Rage’ on 25 January (Badawi, 
2011, pp.64-66).  
It is common to think of the Egyptian revolution as the ‘18-day peaceful revolt in the 
Midan’. This is not accurate. The first four days of the revolution (25 to 28 January) involved 
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violent confrontations between the security forces and the revolutionaries, who burned tens of 
police stations and the Cairo headquarters of the NDP and tried to control the interior 
ministry. The street battles led to the death of hundreds and injury of thousands of citizens 
and police officers (Saad, 2012, p. 22; El-Ghobashy, pp. 22, 38; Badawi, 2011, pp. 78-79). 
The remaining fourteen days (28 January to February 11), however, revealed the emergence 
of a restrained collective actor centred in the Midan 
Initially the police succeeded in preventing the revolutionaries from controlling the 
Midan; but when the police withdrew from the streets on January 28, the regime’s coercive 
capacity began to falter, reflecting a shift in the power balance from the regime to society (El-
Ghabashy, 2012). As a consequence, or by regime design, police withdrawal freed thousands 
of prisoners, causing widespread looting. But the withdrawal facilitated the takeover of the 
Midan by the revolutionaries. The army’s intervention on January 28, however, imposed a 
constraint on further popular protest. Its intention not (and, possibly, inability) to repress the 
revolutionaries led the protest to transform into a political performance centred in the Midan. 
Typical of revolutionary situations, two blocs of contenders with different social 
representations confronted one another (Tilly, 2006, p. 159; Alexander, 2011, 14).  
 
Performing Collective Restraint in the Midan 
Egyptian activists observed a ‘spontaneous [collective] consciousness’ in the Midan. The 
protestors ‘responded to police repression and bullets with flowers and peaceful slogans’ 
(Hussein, 2011, p. 112; Maghdi, 2011, p. 53).  Social psychologist El-Mahdi observed a 
‘great civilised revolution’ (2011, p. 321). 
The crowd in this revolution refutes Gustav Le Bon’s, and other scholars’, assumptions; for 
the crowd was prudent and rational: it did not exercise violence or destruction and, whilst 
more than 10 millions protested in Cairo and the provinces for many days, the movement 
remained peaceful and exercised self-restraint despite the regime’s provocations...   
These observations do not account for the violence that preceded Midan 
demonstrations (or the violence that took place in cities outside Cairo) and do not explain why 
the demonstrators spontaneously exercised collective restraint. To understand collective 
restraint, we need to demarcate an emerging structure of three interdependent actors: the 
Midan demonstrators, the regime, and the public. The demonstrators faced two external 
constraints that can specifically explain their temporary collective restraint. First was the 
regime, which by 28 January was weakened by police withdrawal and the ostensibly neutral 
stand of the military but which still possessed some leverage through the control of public 
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media and Mubarak’s remaining symbolic power. Second, was the Egyptian public (which 
the revolutionaries jokingly called ‘hizb al-kanaba’ (the couch party)) whose support was 
crucial for the success of the revolution or the survival of Mubarak. The Midan performance, 
with its symbols, action, and collective restraint, can be understood as a response to these two 
constraints.  
 
Silmiya!  
No slogan appealed to the Egyptian and international publics like ‘Silmiya’ (Peaceful!). 
Activists have cried Silmiya! before and during the Egyptian revolution whenever police 
forces or the army confronted them. During the demonstration many banners read: ‘Peaceful 
demonstration, no destruction’ (Al-Jamal, 2011, p. 50). In a collective attempt to avoid any 
clashes with the army, but also to draw it closer to the revolutionaries, the demonstrators 
shouted: ‘The people and the army are one’ (The Republic of Tahrir). But this slogan and the 
concomitant restraint of violence have deeper socio-political origins. The army in Egypt was 
not only seen as the ‘guardian of the nation’, but was also perceived as an ‘extraordinary 
institution that is above accountability’ (Darwich, 2013). In his final (10 February) appeal to 
the Egyptians, Mubarak invoked this social perception when he recollected his war 
achievements: ‘I was young as Egypt’s youth today, when I learned the Egyptian military 
honour, allegiance and sacrifice for my country…I lived the days of the (Suez) crossing, 
victory and liberation’ (BBC, 2011).  As a response, the demonstrators had to conform to 
public perceptions by accentuating that they and the army ‘are one’, and that their opposition 
to Mubarak is not a rebellion against the military.  
Origin of this response and the emphasis on Silimiya! is also found in the socio-
political value that dictates a need to preserve “public order and stability”. The Mubarak 
regime through its media and official discourse portrayed the idea of political activism, 
including peaceful protest and demonstration, as ‘a recipe for instability in Egypt’ (Hussein, 
2012). In the public’s mind, political change or reform was indelibly linked with political 
chaos. Such a belief was not unfounded. During the 1980s and 1990s the regime fought a war 
with militant Islamic groups that targeted regime officials and tourists (Naguib, 2009, pp. 
111-2). The ability of the regime to survive these attacks, however, led it to extend its violent 
repression to the opposition; thus during the Mubarak reign ‘Egyptians lived in a state of fear, 
which kept them away from politics’ (El-Mahdi, 2011, pp. 296-7).  
 The barrier of fear from the authorities, however, began to ‘gradually erode’ when 
activists of Kefaya! and the April 6 Movement staged numerous peaceful demonstrations in the 
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years preceding the revolution (El-Mahdi, 2011, p. 297). These also contributed to changing 
the public’s perception of political activism. The Midan demonstration was a continuation of 
these repertoires of contention. As journalist and Midan demonstrator Tabie recounts, the 
emphasis on the peacefulness of the demonstration was to show the broader society that ‘we 
are not violent or aiming to cause chaos as the regime is narrating’ (Personal interview, 2012). 
During the revolution, the regime capitalised on the street-fighting and looting of the first four 
days to instil public fear: in some cases warning of homes being attacked and women being 
raped (El-Mohamady, 2012, p. 30; El-Baltagy in ‘Silmiya’). But crucially, the regime wanted 
to represent itself as the indispensable custodian of security and stability. In his first address 
(01 February) to the Egyptian people, Mubarak argued that, ‘The events of the last few days 
require us all as a people and as a leadership to choose between chaos and stability’ (Reuters, 
2011). Many political activists, however, understood this tactic: a choice the regime imposed 
on the public, which, in a nutshell, they deciphered as ‘Me [Mubarak] or chaos’ (El-Mahdi, 
2011, pp. 304-5; el-Mohamady, 2012, p. 30)
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 The Midan demonstrators wanted to deconstruct regime tactics and narratives. Activists 
recall how they curbed any attempt to cause trouble within the Midan. In one incident, some 
demonstrators tried to break into shops around the Midan; however, others stopped them and 
emphasised the need to ‘protect the public’s properties’ (Nasser qutoted in Saad, 2011, pp. 83-
4). In another, a regime supporter tried to convince the activists to break the demonstration, as 
in his speech Mubarak promised to leave power in 6 months, but when one demonstrator 
wanted to beat up the ‘regime agent’ other activists directly stepped in to restrain him. For 
Tabie ‘we wanted to show that we believe in dialogue not violence; this was not an Iranian 
revolution!’ (Personal interview, 2012). More importantly, however, demonstrators wanted to 
keep the Midan safe from regime infiltration. Accordingly, security checkpoints were 
established at the main entrances of the Midan (‘Silmiya’). The checkpoints became 
increasingly important after the ‘Camel incident’ on 02 February 2011 in which regime 
supporters tried brutally to invade the Midan with camels in a regime-inspired and desperate 
attempt to end the demonstration. The attempt was aborted.
7
        
 It was also important to reassure the broader public of the peacefulness of the 
movement by presenting a counter-representations against regime propaganda. The message 
was transmitted by a ‘newspaper’ published in the Midan, social communication networks, 
satellite televisions (especially anti-Mubarak Aljazeera) and by direct telephone calls to 
families and friends (El-Mahamady, 2012, p. 30; Personal interviews, 2012). As one activist 
 14 
recalls, the aim was to ‘correct [the regime’s] narratives, and refute [its] lies’ (Mohammad 
quoted in Saad, 2011, p.53).  
 
Eid Wahda! 
It is not uncommon for organised political forces to strategically and temporarily unite to 
defeat a common rival. However, it is notable how ideological and religious divisions 
‘evaporated’ in the unorganised crowd of the Midan: ‘you can see the Muslim beside the 
Christian, the Liberal beside the Ikwani [Muslim Brother], the Leftist beside the Salafi’ (el- 
Mahdy, 2011, p. 293; Saad 2012, 43).  Activists argue that the goal of overthrowing Mubarak 
united the politically heterogeneous crowd. Before the revolution, regime change formed the 
‘least-common-denominator goal’ of the Egyptian opposition (Clarke, 2011, p. 406). But the 
slogan ‘Eid Wahda!’ (We are all one!), which the demonstrators cried (The Midan Republic), 
is, like Silmiya!, not simply a ‘spontaneous’ reaction. Rather it was a collective conscious 
response by Midan demonstrators to appeal for public recognition and support. This response 
had origins in the socio-political value of ‘national unity’, which the Mubarak regime claimed 
to protect. The slogan and the representation of a united force was also an attempt to deflate the 
regime strategy that continuously aimed to capitalise on socio-political cleavages to maintain 
power. In this response, demonstrators restrained their ideological and religious associations 
and accentuated national unity. 
 At an ideological level, the demonstrators responded by emphasising that their 
movement is ‘civil’ (read secular), not Islamic. Like the fear of instability that the regime 
diffused in society, Mubarak accentuated the threat of Islamic rule should his regime fall: a 
fear which echoed the worries of many segments of Egyptian society, of Mubarak’s regional 
(especially Arab Gulf) allies, and his Western supporters. His formula here, which the 
demonstrators tried to deconstruct, was: ‘Me or the Islamists’. In the Midan, the Muslim 
Brothers (MB), which was the main organised opposition group, strategically subdued. As 
Mohammad Albeltagy, an MB member, notes: ‘From the beginning we were careful not to be 
in the forefront of the protests’ (Silmiya 2011; Personal interviews, 2012). Whilst this response 
by the organised MB was expected, non-organised Midan demonstrations were also conscious 
to maintain a ‘civil’ appearance to the demonstration. ‘We concealed our ideological 
inclinations’, Tabie recounts, ‘the regime’s propaganda always threatened the public of the rise 
of the Islamists; we wanted to show the opposite: this wasn’t about the Islamists; this is about 
all Egyptians regardless of their religious or political ideology’ (Personal interview, 2012). One 
banner read ‘No Muslim Brothers, no partisanship; this is a people’s revolution’ (el-Jamal, 
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2011, p. 16). When an ‘apparently’ organised group of MB women joined the demonstrations, 
Ahmad Abdel-Hamid, a Midan demonstrator with an Islamic leaning, asked them not to carry 
partisan slogans because the regime wants to ‘frighten the public and international forces of the 
MB; it was necessary to keep all slogans hidden’ (Personal interview, 2012). 
 The demonstrators represented themselves also as a collective political actor that 
transcends religious cleavages. This collective conscious attempt targeted the hesitant Christian 
segments of Egyptian society (the Coptic Church cautioned against participation in the 
demonstrations); but was also crucial to deconstruct Mubarak’s narrative, which represented 
him as the ‘bulwark’ against religious divisions. Here, banners depicted the Christian cross and 
the Muslim crescent interlinked to one another, which in Egyptian memory is reminiscent of 
the national unity that manifested in the uprising against British colonialism in 1919-1922, and 
which has been reproduced in school curricula, art, and cinema.  
 The conjuring up of these national values preceded the Egyptian revolution, however.  
Previous ‘cycles of contention’ established ‘space for overcoming ideological divisions’ (El-
Mahdi, 2009, p. 96). The violent attacks against the church in Alexandria in 2011 led many to 
protest after Facebook activists called for a silent protest in ‘black in commemoration against 
the victims of terrorism’ and to ‘emphasise the unity of Egyptians and their common destiny’ 
(Magdi, 2011, p. 49; El-Mohamady, 2012, p. 9). In the Midan one demonstrator carried a 
banner accusing Mubarak of ‘ingraining [Christian-Muslim] sedition’ (Saad, 2012, p. 164). In 
another—now iconic representation of the demonstration—a group of Christian youth stood in 
a circle to protect their Muslim counterparts as they prayed. A Christian mass was held. Ihab 
el-Kharat, a member of the Egyptian Anglican church, recalls: ‘I never believed that I could 
read from the Bible in the Midan in front of a million Muslim’ (The Repblic of Tahrir 2011). 
This Midan performance stripped the regime of its alleged monopoly as the guardian of 
national unity.  
 Mubarak also employed his remaining symbolic power to drive a wedge between the 
movement and the public. In his final speech (10 February) he presented a dramatic narrative, 
which led many to leave the Midan: ‘I never sought power or fake popularity. I trust that the 
overwhelming majority of the people know who Hosni Mubarak is. It pains me to see how 
some of my countrymen are treating me today’ (BBC 2013). One retreating demonstrator 
recalls how ‘Mubarak played the role really well’ (Silmiya). But to maintain their unity, 
activists tried to ‘thwart this psychological pressure’ (El-Mahdy, 2011, pp. 312-3) and ‘defused 
a message of fear’ (Tabei, 2012; Seif, 2012). Through direct communications with family and 
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friends, demonstrators threatened that if they were to vacate the square the regime will 
persecute and possibly kill them (The Republic of Tahrir, 2011; Personal interviews, 2012).  
 
Performing the Alternative Society 
The Midan demonstration was also a collective promise of what Williams (2004, 106) calls 
‘visions of the good society’ . This society conformed to Egyptian socio-political values of 
“nationalism” and “national independence”; but it also envisioned an Egyptian society with a 
democratic system, clean streets, and an absence of sexual harassment. In short, ‘The Republic 
of Tahrir’ (2011; El-Mahdi, 2011, p. 291) was a collective ‘utopian’ vision of a world the 
revolutionaries wanted to make and represent (Shokr, 2012, p. 42). Nevertheless, performing 
this utopia and the curbing of socio-political affects that accompanied it constituted another 
attempt by the demonstrators to reframe regime propaganda and to gain public recognition. 
 Accusing the opposition of collaborating with external forces is a political rite that the 
Mubarak regime observed on a routine basis. Mubarak’s final struggle with the revolutionaries 
was no exception.  Public and pro-regime media accused the demonstrators of being part of an 
‘external conspiracy’, of being paid 50 EUROS to camp in the Midan, and of enjoying free 
meals from KFC (El-Mohamady, 2012, p. 36). Through these accusations, Mubarak aimed to 
alienate the opposition from the public and to incite divisions within it.  Whilst the regime’s 
decadent strategy rejected improvisation (in some cases accusing the demonstrators of 
simultaneously collaborating with the US, Israel and Iran and Hizbullah!), the opposition has 
learned from previous struggles with the regime to debunk these allegations. In the Midan the 
message that the demonstrators wanted to transmit to the public was: we are Egyptians! And 
are worthy of your support! One demonstrator carried a banner saying ‘KFC is closed, stupid!’ 
Another exhibited Egyptian bread and vegetables with a banner reading ‘This is the KFC!’ (Al-
Jamal, 2011, p. 44). The demonstrators performed nationalistic songs (especially of Sayed 
Darwich, Sheikh Imam, Hafiz) which, in addition to arousing the nationalist and revolutionary 
spirit (Saad, 2012, p. 71), attempted to accentuated the nationalist character of the 
demonstration. When TV presenter, Ahmed Allesily, invited the (pro-Mubarak) public 
television broadcasts to the Midan, many demonstrators protested and began to chant ‘down 
with Mubarak’. But Allesily cautioned them that the public television would not air this; 
instead, he urged the demonstrators to ‘chant nationalist songs for Egypt, so the people at home 
will understand that we are not traitors’ (Silmiya! 2011). 
 The Midan offered a democratic vision for a country that lacked any substantive 
democratic experience. ‘In the Midan you could present any view; you only needed to write 
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your opinion on a placard and tour around with it in the Midan’ (Saad, 2012, p. 44). Members 
of different ideological inclinations freely debated political issues, whilst the ‘radio station’ and 
the ‘newspaper’ that emerged in the Midan guaranteed a balanced representation of different 
political views. ‘The spirit of the Midan transcended any sectarian, provincial, or even 
ideological inclinations’ (Alam, 2011, p. 152). Indeed, in forming an alternative society, the 
Midan was also a safe haven for individuals threatened by regime thugs that terrorised the 
public in surrounding areas (Personal interviews, 2012). As El-Mahdi observes, in passing 
through the checkpoints into the Midan you realise that you have entered a ‘different zone’ 
(2011, p. 293). In the Midan ‘everyone had a place’: 
Rebels young and old, professionals, factory workers, friends and families, performers, lovers, 
street vendors…a spirit of mutual aid prevailed.  Canteens offered free food to anyone in need, 
make-shift clinics provided first aid to the wounded and volunteers…Evenings gave way to 
music and poetry. (Shokr, 2012, p. 42) 
The Midan performance became, as Reicher observes of crowds, ‘the imagined community 
made manifest’ (2011, p.441, italics original). The performance of the utopian society, the 
curbing of political divisions, and the accentuation of a nationalist, democratic and tolerant 
demonstration aimed to reclaim the nation from Mubarak’s domination. During the revolution, 
one activist uploaded a video on YouTube to show the ‘truth about Tahrir’, adding a plea:     
I made this video to show the world that our historical revolution is a clean [,] civilized and 
modern revolution, not driven by any foreign hands or religious groups as shown in some 
unreliable media channels!!! Please share it with those who didn’t go to Tahrir and [are] watching 
the revolution through Aljazeera!!!! (The Truth about Tahrir 2011) 
The regime continued its struggle, however. In the course of the demonstration, in 
addition to portraying the activists as ‘foreign agents’, regime-dominated media accused them 
of polluting the square and of having sex in tents—accusations that attracted counter pro-
regime demonstrations (El-Mohamady, 2012, p. 55). Partly to keep the square they inhabited 
clean, and partly to refute regime propaganda, activists collected trash and made it a point to 
keep the square (which before the revolution was a ‘din of pollution and congestion’ (Shokr, 
201, p. 42)) tidy. On the other hand, although Egypt suffers from high levels of public sexual 
harassment against women, in the 14-day Midan demonstration, no incident of this sort was 
recorded (Personal interviews, 2012). The physical confinement of the crowd in the Midan 
and the threat this would cause for potential perpetrators may explain the restraint. But 
plausible also is that the collective restraint exercised in the Midan was driven by the need to 
preserve the unity of the crowd against regime verbal onslaughts, by providing a safe haven to 
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attract public (especially women) support, and to represent moral values that Egyptians aspire 
to realise.  
 
Conclusion  
The Midan collective restrained performance deprived Mubarak of his symbolic power. On 
11 February 2011 he stepped down. The external constraint that had ingrained a regime of 
socio-political restraints collapsed
8
. On that night, the first case of sexual harassment was 
recorded in the Midan
9
. The two years that have followed revealed a shift in power from 
regime to society. Attacks on policemen became a noticeable feature on Egyptian streets. 
Political divisions between the Islamists (who, after decades of restraint, became more vocal 
about their political and sectarian opinions) and the secular opposition (which fears the 
emergence of an authoritarian Islamic state) developed into bloody confrontations—signalling 
the existence of a deep-rooted civil conflict. Mistrust in the security forces gave rise to 
clandestine groups such as the ‘Black Block’, which espouses the use of violence when 
necessary to ‘protect the goals of the revolution’ against Islamist ‘militias’ (Matta, 2013). The 
flag of the ‘Republic of Port Said’ flew in the province in defiance of a government decision 
to curb the bloody protests that erupted against a court decision (Awad, 2013).     
    In this article I studied the Midan demonstration during the Egyptian revolution of 
2011, by shedding theoretical and empirical light on the notion of collective restraint action. 
In examining the Midan collective action and the protests that preceded it, the paper 
corroborates existing literature that treats collective behaviour as ‘socially meaningful’ 
(Reicher, 2011). Collective restraint, I showed, is one example of such social deliberation. In 
examining collective action in regime-society struggles, however, I went further to locate the 
socio-political sources that motivate collective restraint. I showed that the ostensibly 
‘spontaneous’ action in the Midan can be attributed to a collective consciousness of regime 
strategy and narrative, socio-political values, and repertoires of contention as external 
constraints that delimit political action  and motivate restraint. 
The paper finds that the Mubarak regime had a determining effect on the collective 
restraint action of the demonstrators; but the study also shows that this only became possible 
after the protest transformed into a contentious performance centred in the Midan. With 
Mubarak’s fall, the locus of the system of external constraints which he had established, and 
which had structured the behaviour of his rivals, dissolved. Concerted efforts targeting 
Mubarak have now diffused; Egypt is in the process of forging a new system of constraints. 
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The study of collective restraints provides a novel theoretical entry into contentious 
politics. It contributes to our questions on how, when, and why political protests develop and 
transform, employ or abstain from using violence, accentuate or inhibit the usage of certain 
slogans. The framework developed here may throw light on other cases such as Bahrain, 
where the uprising remains peaceful, or Syria where the protest turned violent. The starting 
point would be to demarcate the system of cultural and material contexts that enable or 
constrain contentious actors.  
                                                        
 
Notes 
1 Commenting on the Egyptian revolution, President Barack Obama noted: ‘Egyptians have inspired us, and 
they’ve done so by putting the lie to the idea that justice is best gained through violence.  For in Egypt, it was the 
moral force of nonviolence –not terrorism, not mindless killing –but nonviolence, moral force that bent the arc of 
history toward justice once more. See ‘Remarks by the President’ available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/11/remarks-president-egypt  
2 El-Ghobashy, 2012; Beissinger, 2011; Reicher, 2011; Ismail, 2011; El-Mahdy, 2011; El-Mahdy, 2009; Reiss, 
2007; Alexander et.al., 2006; Tilly, 2008; Schwedler, 2006; Tilly, 2006; Eyerman, 2006; Steinberg, 1999; 
Ellingson, 1995. 
3 One exception is Tyler and Degoey (1995) who examine ‘collective restraint in social dilemmas’; but 
their study focuses on how people in the case of the 1991 California water shortage chose to support 
existing authorities not on collective political protest.  
4 I carried 14 semi-structured interviews in Cairo in the period 25 April – 07 May, 2012. The sample included 
individuals from different ideological inclinations (Islamists, Socialists, Liberals, and independents) who 
participated in the Midan demonstrations. All interviews were conducted in Arabic. In addition to the interviews 
I draw information from first hand accounts available in books, documentaries, speeches and YouTube clips. All 
quotations from Arabic sources in the article are my own translation.  
5 A regime is ‘an alliance of dominant ideological, economic, and military power actors coordinated by the rulers 
of the state’ (Mann, 1993, p.18-19) 
6 One song of the  ‘Ultras Ahlawi’ football team talks about a regime that imposed a choice on its people 
‘between its rule and chaos in the country’. See ‘Hikayatna’ [Our story] available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2hYgkXjdJI  
7 In that incident, which continued for more than 12 hours, football supporters of both Ahli and Zamalek 
teams and organised members of the Muslim Brothers helped defend the Midan against the camel 
invasion (Personal interviews 2012).   
8 Building on Elias, Fletcher (1997/2005, 83-4) argues that external constraints collapse with ‘shifts in the 
balance of social constraint and self-restraint, changes in the social standards of feeling and behaviour, and 
changes in the scope of mutual identification’, which result because of  ‘a decrease in the (state) control of the 
monopoly of violence, a fragmentation of social ties and a shortening of chains of commercial, emotional and 
cognitive interference’. 
9 The case in point is Lara Logan, a journalist, who was sexually assaulted and raped as she was covering 
the event in the Midan : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1E1Ld93qyXc . Accessed on 13 February 
2013. On the second anniversary of the revolution, 19 cases of sexual harassment against women were 
recorded in the Midan, see http://observers.france24.com/ar/content/20130213. Accessed on 19 
February 2013.  
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